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Abstract
Various defense schemes — which determine the presence of an attack
on the in-vehicle network — have recently been proposed. However, they
fail to identify which Electronic Control Unit (ECU) actually mounted the
attack. Clearly, pinpointing the attacker ECU is essential for fast/efficient
forensic, isolation, security patch, etc. To meet this need, we propose a
novel scheme, called Viden (Voltage-based attacker identification), which
can identify the attacker ECU by measuring and utilizing voltages on the
in-vehicle network. The first phase of Viden, called ACK learning, deter-
mines whether or not the measured voltage signals really originate from
the genuine message transmitter. Viden then exploits the voltage mea-
surements to construct and update the transmitter ECUs’ voltage profiles
as their fingerprints. It finally uses the voltage profiles to identify the
attacker ECU. Since Viden adapts its profiles to changes inside/outside
of the vehicle, it can pinpoint the attacker ECU under various conditions.
Moreover, its efficiency and design-compliance with modern in-vehicle net-
work implementations make Viden practical and easily deployable. Our
extensive experimental evaluations on both a CAN bus prototype and
two real vehicles have shown that Viden can accurately fingerprint ECUs
based solely on voltage measurements and thus identify the attacker ECU
with a low false identification rate of 0.2%.
1 Introduction
Remote and/or driverless control of a car is no longer science fiction. In fact,
demonstration and deployment of such a vehicle control have become prevalent,
triggering significant R&D efforts and investments from industry, governments,
and academia. Despite their numerous benefits, these technological develop-
ments have created serious safety/security concerns.
These concerns are genuine and real. For example, researchers evaluated
various remote access points on vehicles and demonstrated that an attacker can
exploit them to remotely compromise Electronic Control Units (ECUs) [1]. By
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exploiting the compromised ECUs, researchers have shown that it is feasible to
remotely control or even shut down a vehicle [2, 3, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7].
Numerous schemes have been proposed to detect and/or prevent various
vehicle cyber attacks [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Although these countermeasures
are capable of determining whether or not there is an intrusion in the in-vehicle
network, they cannot determine which ECU is actually mounting the attack,
i.e., incapable of attacker identification. This is because in-vehicle networks are
mostly configured as broadcast buses and their messages lack information on
the transmitters. An accurate attacker identification, however, is imperative
as it provides a swift pathway for forensic, isolation, security patch, etc. No
matter how well an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) detects the presence of
an intrusion in a vehicle, if we still do not know which ECU is mounting the
attack and hence which ECU to isolate/patch, the vehicle remains insecure and
unsafe. It is much better and more economical to isolate/patch the attacker
ECU, than blindly treating all ECUs as (possible) attackers.
To meet this essential need for attacker identification — that existing so-
lutions have not yet been able to satisfactorily meet — we propose a novel
scheme, called Viden (Voltage-based attacker identification), which fingerprints
message transmitter ECUs on Controller Area Network (CAN) via voltage mea-
surements and thus facilitates attacker identification. Of the various in-vehicle
network protocols, we focus on CAN as it is the de facto standard for in-vehicle
networks and its adoption has been mandated in all cars manufactured since
2008 [15]. The rationale behind using voltage for fingerprinting ECUs is the ex-
istence of small inherent discrepancies in different ECUs’ voltage outputs when
they inject messages. To capture this and then use it to fingerprint the trans-
mitter ECUs, Viden first monitors the output voltages from the two dedicated
wires on the CAN bus: CAN-High (CANH) and CAN-Low (CANL). All ECUs’
transceivers are connected to, and use these for their message transmissions and
receptions. Through the acquired voltage measurements for each message ID,
Viden first learns the ACK threshold, the key information Viden uses to dis-
card the measurements of voltages outputted by ECUs while acknowledging the
receipt of, but not transmitting, the message. Viden utilizes the thus-derived
ACK threshold to learn the voltage output behavior of each in-vehicle ECU by
constructing new features called voltage instances. Then, it transforms those
instances to the transmitter ECU’s voltage profile (i.e., fingerprint) via Recur-
sive Least Square (RLS) algorithm, an adaptive signal processing technique.
As a result, Viden utilizes the derived voltage profiles for an accurate attacker
identification. Through experimental evaluations on a CAN bus prototype and
on two real vehicles, we show that the constructed voltage profiles are distinct
for different ECUs, thus validating Viden’s capability of identifying the attacker
ECU.
While there have been proposals to fingerprint ECUs with timing [14] or
voltage (like Viden) measurements [16, 17], their practicality and efficiency in
identifying the attacker ECU remain limited to only certain attack scenarios,
mainly because they were designed for intrusion detection, not attacker iden-
tification. In other words, there are many scenarios in which existence of an
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attack is detected but the attacker cannot be identified correctly. Thus, we de-
sign, implement, and evaluate Viden by focusing on attacker identification via
a distinct way of fingerprinting ECUs from the existing schemes. As a result,
Viden is efficient and easy to deploy on any ECU, thanks to its adaptability and
practicality.
Adaptability. Existing voltage-based fingerprinting uses supervised batch learn-
ing that generates a norm model by learning from a pre-defined training data
set [16, 17]. So, until the training data set and hence models/fingerprints are
updated again, the norm models remain unchanged. Such an approach, how-
ever, cannot adapt the norm models to unexpected changes (e.g., changes in
temperature) inside/outside the vehicle. More importantly, adversaries who in-
tentionally generate changes can evade these existing fingerprinting schemes.
Viden takes a very different approach from them in that it models and updates
the voltage-based fingerprints by applying adaptive signal processing (i.e., online
(not batch) learning) to its new set of features: voltage instances. This enables
Viden to correctly modify the fingerprints and hence adapt to inevitable but
unpredictable changes in vehicles that can either occur naturally (due to the
mother nature) or be intentionally triggered by an intelligent adversary. Such
adaptability is essential for vehicle security.
Practicality. Unlike the existing voltage-based fingerprinting schemes, the
unique approach taken by Viden eliminates the requirement/assumption of us-
ing a specific CAN message type or CAN bus speed, thus facilitating its de-
ployment. Moreover, it does not require any knowledge of which message fields
the voltages are measured on, i.e., message-field-agnostic. This enables Viden
to achieve its goal even with a low voltage sampling rate, thus lowering cost.
Furthermore, even though it is message-field-agnostic, since Viden filters out
undesired samples using its derived ACK thresholds, there is no need to impose
restrictions on which fields of the message should be sampled to run Viden.
All of these salient features enable Viden to run without re-designing current
CAN controllers and make Viden very practical and cost-efficient, which is very
important for the cost-conscious automotive industry.
We have implemented and evaluated Viden on a CAN bus prototype and
on two real vehicles. Our evaluation results show that Viden can identify the
attacker ECU with a low false identification rate of 0.2%, thanks to its unique
fingerprinting that makes it adaptive to handle various attack scenarios.
This paper makes the following main contributions:
1. Proposal of a new scheme which retains only the voltage measurements
output by the transmitter ECU (Section 3.4);
2. Design of Viden which constructs voltage profiles, i.e., fingerprints, by
modeling the norm voltage output behaviors of in-vehicle ECUs and ex-
ploits them for accurate identification of the attacker ECU (Sections 3.5–
3.8);
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Figure 1: Message transmission via outputting voltages.
3. Implementation and demonstration of Viden on a CAN bus prototype and
on two real vehicles (Section 4).
2 Background
2.1 CAN Message Transmission
In-vehicle ECUs broadcast their retrieved sensor data via a CAN frame/message.
Instead of carrying the address of the transmitter/receiver, as shown in Fig. 1a,
it contains a unique identifier (ID), which represents its priority. Starting from
a 0-bit followed by a sequence of dominant (0) or recessive (1) bits, all fields
within the CAN frame are sent on the bus by the “transmitter ECU” except for
the Acknowledgment (ACK) slot. The ACK slot is, in fact, used by all ECUs at
the same time — except for the transmitter ECU — that have correctly received
the preceded fields of the ACK slot, regardless of whether they are interested
in their content or not. If correctly received, those ECUs send a 0-bit in the
ACK slot. Thus, multiple ECUs acknowledge the message simultaneously, even
before the transmitter finishes sending its message on the bus.
To send either a 0- or 1-bit, CAN transceivers (are agreed to) output certain
voltage levels on the two dedicated CAN wires: CANH and CANL. As shown
in Fig. 1b, to issue a 0-bit on the CAN bus, CAN transceivers (are agreed to)
output approximately 3.5V on CANH and 1.5V on CANL so that the differ-
ential voltage becomes approximately 2V. On the other hand, when sending a
1-bit, the transceivers output approximately 2.5V on both CANH and CANL,
yielding a differential voltage of approximately 0V [18, 19]. So, by measuring
the differential voltage of CANH and CANL, receiver ECUs read the streams
of 0 and 1 bits, and thus receive the message. From this perspective, CAN is a
differential bus.
CAN transceivers output the intended voltages by simultaneously switch-
ing on/off their transistors. Fig. 2a shows an equivalent schematic of a CAN
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Figure 2: Output schematics of a CAN transceiver.
transceiver [20, 21]. Note that CAN transceivers of multiple ECUs are con-
nected to the CAN bus in parallel, thus sharing the same load resistance RL,
which is normally set to 60Ω [22]. The high- and low-side output circuits consist
of a series diode and a P- and N-channel transistor, respectively.
For the transceiver to send a 1-bit, both the high and low side transistors are
switched off and are thus in a high impedance state. This results in negligible
current flowing from VCC to ground, yielding negligible differential voltage on
CANH and CANL. On the other hand, when sending a 0-bit, both transistors
are turned on and are thus in a low impedance state. When the transistors
are on, they can be equivalently described as resistors with drain-to-source on-
state resistance RDSON as shown in Fig. 2b, where current flows from VCC to
ground through RL and thus creates a differential voltage of (approximately)
2V between CANH and CANL. This way, the CAN transceivers are capable of
outputting either 0 or 2V of differential voltage on the two CAN wires.
2.2 Related Work
Researchers have attempted to fingerprint ECUs in various ways, mostly for the
purpose of intrusion detection.
A clock-based intrusion detection system (CIDS) was proposed in [14] to
detect intrusions by fingerprinting ECUs on CAN. CIDS derived the fingerprints
by extracting the ECUs’ clock skews from message arrival times. While the
main objective of CIDS was to detect intrusions, the authors of [14] mentioned
that the thus-derived fingerprints may also be used for attacker identification,
but only when attack messages are injected periodically. In other words, if
the attacker transmits messages aperiodically, then CIDS cannot identify the
attacker ECU, i.e., the adversary can evade CIDS as far as attacker identification
is concerned. Viden takes an entirely different approach: looking at attack
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messages from the perspective of ECUs’ output voltages on CAN. This allows
Viden to accurately identify the attacker ECU irrespective of how and when the
attacker injects its messages, which is crucial for attacker identification.
Instead of fingerprinting ECUs based on message timings, as in Viden, some
researchers also proposed to fingerprint them via voltage measurements. The
authors of [16] used the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of voltage measurements as
fingerprints of ECUs. However, they were shown to be valid only for the voltages
measured during the transmission of CAN message IDs, and more importantly
when voltages were measured on a low-speed (10Kbps) CAN bus; this is far
from contemporary vehicles that usually operate on a 500Kbps CAN bus.
To overcome these difficulties, researchers proposed to extract other time
and frequency domain features of voltage measurements (e.g., RMS amplitude)
and use them as inputs for classification; more specifically, supervised (batch)
learning algorithms (e.g., SVM) [17]. This way, they were able to fingerprint
ECUs with enhanced accuracy and was successful on high-speed CAN buses.
However, this solution was neither practical nor attractive for attacker identifi-
cation for the following reasons. First, it required not only a high sampling rate
(2.5 GSamples/sec), but also the use of the extended CAN frame format with
29-bit IDs, which is seldom used (due to its bandwidth waste) in contempo-
rary vehicles; most vehicles use the standard format with 11-bit IDs. Moreover,
since the modeling was done via batch learning, unpredictable changes in the
CAN bus (e.g., temperature, battery level) and adversary’s behaviors can lead
to false identifications. These will be detailed later when we discuss the details
of Viden.
In contrast, Viden fingerprints ECUs very differently and hence achieves
effective attacker identification (1) through online update of fingerprints via
adaptive signal processing to provide adaptability; (2) at a low sampling rate
(50 KSamples/sec); and more importantly, (3) without imposing restrictions on
the type of CAN message or the speed of CAN bus to be used. As a result, the
deployment of Viden in legacy and new vehicles will be much easier.
3 Viden
Attacker identification is essential for expedited forensic, isolation, and security
patches, all of which are the key requirements for vehicle safety. To meet this
need, we propose a novel fingerprinting scheme, Viden, that exploits small in-
herent discrepancies in different ECUs’ voltage outputs. Before delving into the
inner workings of Viden, we first describe the system and threat models.
3.1 System and Threat Models
3.1.1 System Model
The vehicle’s CAN bus under consideration is assumed to have been equipped
with an IDS as well as a timing- (e.g., CIDS [14]) and voltage-based (e.g.,
schemes in [17, 16] or Viden) fingerprinting device; the latter complements the
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former via attacker identification. We discern a fingerprinting device from an
IDS based on the fact that the IDS detects the presence of an attack whereas the
fingerprinting device identifies the source of the (detected) attack. An attack
can be mounted by the adversary who has control of a physically/remotely
compromised ECU. In our system model, however, we consider such an ECU
to have been remotely compromised and thus controlled by the adversary as
in [1, 23]. We do not consider a compromised device which was attached to
the in-vehicle network (e.g., device plugged in the OBD-II port), as it requires
physical access and its identification has been addressed elsewhere [24, 17]. So,
the compromised ECU we consider is one of those originally installed on the
vehicle’s CAN bus.
3.1.2 Threat Model
By injecting fabricated attack messages through his compromised ECU, the
attacker can control the vehicle maneuver. We consider the attacker to be
smarter than this: beyond just controlling the vehicle, the attacker’s goal is to
also hide the identity of the ECU injecting the attack messages. That is, while
the deployed IDS may detect the presence of an attack, the adversary tries to
evade the fingerprinting device, i.e., prevent it from determining the source of
the attack. For evasion, the adversary can perform two different impersonations
when injecting his attack messages:
• Arbitrary impersonation: The attacker misleads the fingerprinting device
to think that some arbitrary ECU other than himself is the attacker.
• Targeted impersonation: The attacker acts smarter by impersonating a
targeted ECU for evasion, i.e., make the fingerprinting device believe that
the targeted ECU is the attacker.
Depending on the adversary’s capabilities and knowledge of different defense
schemes (available in the market or in literature) as well as their operation, his
approach to evading a fingerprinting device would be different. Specifically,
based on whether the adversary is aware of the fact that an in-vehicle ECU
can be fingerprinted via timing and/or voltage measurements, his best effort in
achieving his goal would be different. Thus, we consider three different types of
adversaries: naive, timing-aware, and timing-voltage-aware adversaries.
While all attackers are capable of injecting and sniffing messages on the
CAN bus, a naive adversary does not have any knowledge of how ECUs can be
fingerprinted (either via timing or voltage), due possibly to lack of his technical
expertise or curiosity. Thus, the naive adversary injects his attack messages
imprudently at arbitrary times with forged message IDs (for impersonation).
An intelligent adversary, however, might know how ECUs can be finger-
printed via timing analysis. Thus, the adversary uses his knowledge to evade
any (possibly-installed) fingerprinting scheme as much as possible as follows.
The adversary logs CAN traffic, learns the timing behavior of other ECUs, and
exploits the learned information in injecting attack messages at the appropriate
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Figure 3: An overview of Viden.
(learned) times so as to imitate other ECUs’ timing behavior. This way, the
adversary can perform arbitrary/targeted impersonation and thus attempt to
evade the fingerprinting device. We refer to this adversary as a timing-aware
adversary.
The adversary might also have knowledge of how ECUs can be fingerprinted
via voltage and timing measurements. Hence, when injecting attack messages,
such an adversary may try to exploit his knowledge in impersonating other
ECU(s) and thus evade any fingerprinting device as much as possible. We call
this adversary a timing-voltage-aware adversary. We consider such an adversary
to be capable of changing his voltage outputs via running battery draining
processes, changing the supply voltage level, or by heating up or cooling down
the ECU. Although he can change them to a certain level, we consider him to be
incapable of precisely controlling their instantaneous values. This is reasonable
as precise control of voltages would require, for example, control of even the
ambient temperature. By changing his ECU’s voltage outputs to a certain
level in which the targeted ECU is outputting, a timing-voltage-aware adversary
can perform a targeted impersonation. Similarly, he can arbitrarily change the
output levels for arbitrary impersonation. Since changing his voltage levels
(either before or during message injections) does not necessarily imply that
he is attacking the CAN bus, in this paper, we differentiate “impersonation”
from an actual attack of message injections. In addition, the adversary might
even know when the voltage-based fingerprints are updated (if not updated in
real time) and thus use that as a reference in determining when to perform
arbitrary/targeted impersonation. Note, however, that he must ”play” within
the setting boundaries of the given CAN bus. For example, the attacker cannot
control/tune the values of resistors within the CAN bus in order to control the
voltage levels, as this requires physical access.
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3.2 High-Level Overview of Viden
As shown in Fig. 3, Viden fingerprints ECUs via voltage measurements and
achieves attacker identification in four phases.
Phase 1: Viden measures the CANH & CANL voltages and maps the
recently acquired values to the ID of the message it has just received through
the ECU’s receive buffer. Then, for that message ID, Viden learns its ACK
threshold. This threshold helps Viden determine whether or not the measured
voltage originates from the actual message transmitter. Phase 1 is run in the
initialization step of Viden and when an update is necessary.
Phase 2: Exploiting the learned ACK threshold, Viden selects voltages
that are outputted solely by the message transmitter. Then, Viden uses them
to derive a voltage instance, which is a set of features that reflect the transmitter
ECU’s voltage output behavior. Phase 2 and onwards are run iteratively.
Phase 3: Viden uses every newly derived voltage instance to update the
voltage profile of the message transmitter. When an attack is detected by the
IDS, Viden constructs a voltage profile for the attack messages and maps that
profile to one of those Viden has, thus identifying the attacker ECU.
Phase 4: The results from Phase 3 are verified further via multi-class clas-
sification, only when necessary.
For a given message ID, only one ECU is assigned for its transmission in
most cases. Thus, for now we consider the relationship between the numbers of
ECUs, IDs, and voltage profiles to be 1, N(≥ 1), and 1, respectively. We will
discuss further in Section 5 on how Viden deals with cases where the relationship
between the numbers of ECUs and IDs might be N and 1, respectively.
3.3 CANH and CANL Voltage Outputs
Before presenting the details of Viden, we first discuss which voltage character-
istics of ECUs it exploits for attacker identification.
Variations in supply and ground voltages. Fig. 4 shows a typical ECU
connection to CAN [20, 21]. In order to output the desired voltage levels on
CANH and CANL, transceivers are powered with the nominal supply voltage
(VCC) of 5V, which is provided and maintained by a voltage regulator. The
input of the regulator, VIN , comes from a power supply, i.e., a 12V/24V bat-
tery powering all the ECUs [25]. Not only the voltage regulator but also the
9
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connected bypass capacitors help stabilize the VCC level. However, the output
voltage of an ECU’s regulator varies independently and differently from other
ECUs’ regulators, as their supply characteristics are different (e.g., different
regulators’ common-mode rejection ratios). Thus, there are inherent, small but
non-negligible differences in ECUs’ VCC . There exist variations in not only VCC
but also in the ground voltage since there does not exist a perfect ground [22].
For these reasons, CAN transceivers are built to operate over a range of
voltages (e.g., TI TCAN10xx devices are designed to handle 10% supply vari-
ations [21]). This guarantees transceivers with different VCC and/or ground to
communicate messages correctly.
Variations in on-state resistance. When transceivers send a 0-bit, their
two transistors are turned on so that the flowing current generates the re-
quired differential voltage between CANH and CANL. In such a case, tran-
sistors in the transceivers are considered as resistors RDSON,P/N (see Fig. 2b).
Although transceivers are designed to have the same RDSON,P/N values, pro-
cess/manufacturing variations/imperfections cause transistors’ RDSON,P/N val-
ues to be slightly different from each other [26].
Fig. 5 shows a typical circuit diagram of a CAN transceiver. Transistors’
RDSON values are inversely related to their gate voltages, which are supplied
by a driver, i.e., a fully differential amplifier [27, 28]. Interestingly, since the
driver input is affected by VCC , which also varies with ECU, the transistors’
gate voltages are also affected by VCC . Therefore, variations in VCC lead to
variations in transistors’ actual RDSON values. In summary,
V1. There exist differences/variations in CAN transceivers’ nominal supply
voltage, ground voltage, and RDSON,P/N values, especially during the trans-
mission of a 0-bit.
When transmitting a 1-bit, the two transistors are simply turned off and
thus there is little voltage variation between nodes. Hence, we do not consider
any voltage measurements when the transmitter was sending a 1-bit. Instead,
we only consider those measured when it was sending a 0-bit, and refer to those
as dominant voltages.
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Variations in dominant voltages. From Fig. 2b, when transceiver i is
transmitting a 0-bit, the current, I(i) flowing from its VCC(i) to its ground can
be derived as I(i) =
VCC(i)−VG(i)−2VD
RDSON,P (i)+RDSON,N(i)+RL
, where VG(i) denotes its ground
voltage, and VD the diodes’ forward bias (assuming they are equivalent). To
simplify the analysis, we omit other factors such as leakage current or varia-
tions in diodes. We can thus derive the CANH and CANL dominant voltages,
VCANH(i) and VCANL(i), from transceiver i as:
VCANH(i) = VCC(i) − VD − I(i)RDSON,P (i),
VCANL(i) = VG(i) + VD + I(i)RDSON,N(i).
(1)
From Eq. (1), one can see that
V2. Variations in VCC , ground, and RDSON,P/N result in different ECUs with
different CANH and CANL dominant voltages.
For this reason, the ISO11898-2 specifies that a compliant transceiver must ac-
commodate dominant voltages of CANH=2.75∼4.5V and CANL=0.5∼2.25V [19].
Hence, we refer to any voltage values meeting this requirement as dominant volt-
ages.
Transient changes in on-state resistances. In Fig. 5, when VOUT+
of the driver increases, VOUT− concurrently decreases as they are differential
outputs. So, for both transistors, the absolute differences between their gate
and source voltages simultaneously decrease. This results in both RDSON,P
and RDSON,N to increase, i.e., change in the same direction [27, 28]. Even
when a change in the ECU temperature affects RDSON,P & RDSON,N , they
change in the same direction. So, for a given VCC and ground voltage, the
opposite signs of I(i)RDSON,P/N(i) in (1) indicate that
V3. Transient changes in the ECU temperature and driver’s input/output affect
RDSON,P/N , and thus make VCANH and VCANL temporarily deviate in the
“opposite” direction.
Since regulated VCC and ground voltage remain constant, and are not af-
fected by transient changes in RDSON,P/N ,
V4. Transient changes in VCC and ground are significantly smaller than those
in VCANH and VCANL, i.e., their values remain relatively constant.
V1–V4 indicate that CANH and CANL dominant voltages of each ECU
are different from each other. Viden exploits this fact in constructing different
voltage profiles for (fingerprinting) ECUs.
3.4 Phase 1: ACK Threshold Learning
Viden is designed to run with a low voltage sampling rate so that it can be
easily installed as a low-cost software application, which requires no changes in
the CAN protocol; the high rate of voltage sampling would only be required for
11
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the CAN protocol to receive messages as it is designed to be. Such a feature,
however, renders Viden incapable of determining at which slot the voltage values
were measured; all it knows is the value. Thus, Viden goes through a phase of
learning the ACK threshold, which determines whether or not the measured
voltage was outputted by the message transmitter.
Measuring dominant voltages. Viden’s measurement is triggered when-
ever a CANH voltage exceeds 2.75V after a certain idle period. This is because
the first measured voltage exceeding 2.75V represents the case of some trans-
mitter transmitting a 0-bit on the bus [19]. Since Viden is only interested in
dominant voltages, it discards any measurements that are lower than 2.75V on
CANH and higher than 2.25V on CANL. The measurement continues until some
message is shown to have been received into Viden’s receive message buffer, i.e.,
an indication that the transmitter has finished sending a message. By read-
ing the ID value of that received message, Viden knows which message ID the
acquired dominant voltages correspond to.
Non-ACK voltages. Viden continues collection of more dominant volt-
ages for the acquired ID (whenever the message is received) until it learns its
CANH and CANL ACK thresholds. When collecting and exploiting voltage
measurements, one needs to be cautious of the fact “During the ACK slot of a
transmitted message, if received, all other nodes but its transmitter output a
0-bit on the CAN bus” [29]. Thus, even though Viden samples at least a few
dominant voltages while receiving a certain message, not all represent the out-
puts from the actual message transmitter. Fig. 6 shows an example of Viden’s
five voltage measurements of {3.4V, 2.6V, 2.5V, 3.3V, 3.8V} from the CANH
line during the reception of a message, where 3.8V was measured during the
ACK slot. Of them, Viden discards measurements {2.6V, 2.5V} as they do not
meet the criteria of dominant voltages. If Viden had considered the remaining 3
measurements as if they were output by the message transmitter, it would have
been incorrect since 3.8V was from all ECUs but the message transmitter in the
ACK slot. Therefore, to accurately fingerprint the transmitter ECU, Viden de-
rives the ACK threshold which distinguishes a non-ACK voltage measurement
from an ACK voltage measurement. We refer to non-ACK voltages as domi-
nant voltages measured from slots other than the ACK slot, and ACK voltages
as those measured from the ACK slot. The threshold is derived by exploiting
the following two facts of the ACK voltage.
K1. Low probability: Since ACK is only 1 bit long, when measuring dominant
voltages during a message reception, most of them would be outputted
12
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Figure 7: ACK threshold in a CAN bus prototype.
from the message transmitter.
K2. Different voltage level for ACK: During an ACK slot, all ECUs but the
transmitter acknowledge their message reception. Since those responders
are connected in parallel and turned on concurrently, when receiving the
ACK, the measured voltages are much higher on CANH and much lower
on CANL than those when receiving non-ACK bits.
Viden exploits these facts to collect M dominant voltages from both CANH
and CANL for N rounds for a given message ID. So, based on K1, the most
frequently measured voltage value (of the M values) will most likely represent the
non-ACK voltage. During the N rounds, we refer to the set of N most frequently
measured values as the most frequent set, Sfreq. On the other hand, if we were
to determine the maximum and the minimum of the M values from CANH
and CANL, respectively, then they would represent ACK as well as non-ACK
voltages. This is because even a single dominant voltage value collected (without
awareness) from the ACK slot would become the maximum/minimum of the M
values due to K2. Here, the set of N maximum/minimum values measured from
CANH/CANL is defined as the maximum/minimum set, denoted as Smax/min.
For each message ID, Viden exploits sets Sfreq and Smax/min to derive the ACK
threshold that differentiates a non-ACK voltage from an ACK voltage.
Derivation of ACK threshold. Fig. 7 shows the kernel density plots of the
most frequent and the maximum sets of the measured dominant voltages from
the CANH line. The measurements were made while running Viden on our CAN
bus prototype, which will be detailed in Section 4. One can see that only for the
maximum set, there exists a side lobe, whereas the most frequent set resembles
a Gaussian distribution. Note that during the N rounds of M measurements
each, the most frequent and the maximum values can be different. Thus, from
the maximum set, Viden first discards values lower than max(Sfreq) +BσSfreq ,
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where σSfreq is the standard deviation of set Sfreq, and B a design parameter
determining how aggressive one wants to be in discarding ACK voltages. Note
that such a value also represents the rightmost end-point of the most frequent
set’s kernel density (e.g., dotted vertical line in Fig. 7). Then, the usual side lobe
of the maximum set (Smax) becomes the main lobe of a refined maximum set,
S′max. From S
′
max, Viden determines Γ1 = median(S
′
max)− 3MAD(S′max) and
Γ2 = µS′max−3σS′max , where MAD(x) denotes the median absolute deviation of
x, and µx its mean. The CANH ACK threshold of the given message ID (or its
transmitter), ΓHACK , is then derived to be max(Γ1,Γ2). We take the maximum
of the two to be conservative in discarding any non-ACK voltages. Moreover,
not only the lower 3σ limit but also the lower 3-MAD limit is used since the
refined maximum set S′max may still contain its own (new) side lobe as shown
in Fig. 7, i.e., an outlier for S′max. Using these processes, the ACK threshold
of the example in Fig. 7 is determined to be ΓHACK = 3.499V — a point where
the two lobes in the maximum set are separated. Depending on the transmitter
ECU, the ACK threshold can be different as the set of responders is different.
Thus, the ACK learning is performed for all message IDs of interest.
When deriving the CANL ACK threshold, ΓLACK , the minimum (instead
of the maximum) and the upper (instead of the lower) limits are used. In
Appendix A, we show that the proposed scheme can correctly determine the
ACK thresholds even in real vehicles.
3.5 Phase 2: Deriving a Voltage Instance
Once ACK thresholds, ΓHACK and Γ
L
ACK , of the given message ID are learned,
from that point and on, Viden continuously collects dominant voltages, but
discards those from CANH that are lower than 2.75V or higher than ΓHACK ,
and those from CANL that are higher than 2.25V or lower than ΓLACK . This
way, Viden selects and processes only non-ACK voltages. Whenever Viden
obtains κ new measurements of CANH and CANL non-ACK voltages, Viden
derives a new voltage instance which is defined as the set of 6 tracking points,
F1–F6.
F1–F2: Most frequent values. Similarly to Phase 1, Viden determines
the most frequently measured CANH and CANL voltages (from κ values), which
are denoted as F1 and F2, respectively. Since Viden knows the ACK thresholds,
the main differences from Phase 1 are that only non-ACK voltages as well as κ
(< M) of them are used in deriving the most frequent values. This way, Viden
keeps track of the median of the transmitter’s dominant voltages.
F3–F6: Dispersions. Viden also keeps track of the dispersions of CANH
and CANL dominant voltages. As the transmitter’s voltage output behavior can
change over time, Viden continuously updates 4 different tracking points, F3–F6,
which reflect (1) F3: 75th, (2) F5: 90th percentile of the transmitter’s CANH
outputs, (3) F4: 25th, and (4) F6: 10th percentile of CANL outputs. By tracking
the transmitter’s voltage distribution, Viden understands its momentary voltage
output behavior. Thus, voltage instances represent those momentary behaviors.
Since even a single ACK voltage can significantly distort Viden’s understanding
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Algorithm 1 Dispersion Update
1: function UpdateDispersion(V,Λ, P ∗)
2: return Λ← Λ + α(P ∗ − #(V <Λ)
#V
)3 . Adjust tracking position
3: end function
4: if #measured CANH and CANL voltages both ≥ κ then
5: VH , VL ← {past κR CANH, CANL measurements}
6: F3 ← UpdateDispersion(VH , F3, 0.75)
7: F4 ← UpdateDispersion(VL, F4, 0.25)
8: F5 ← UpdateDispersion(VH , F5, 0.9)
9: F6 ← UpdateDispersion(VL, F6, 0.1)
10: end if
of transmitters’ behaviors, it is important to learn the ACK threshold. The
reasons for Viden’s tracking of different percentiles of CANH and CANL are
that the low percentiles of CANH would contain voltages measured when the
transmitter switches from sending a 1-bit to sending a 0-bit, and vice versa.
The same applies for the high percentiles of CANL measurements. Although
other percentiles can be tracked as well, to minimize Viden’s overhead, we only
track F3–F6.
Algorithm 1 describes how the tracked dispersions are updated whenever
Viden acquires κ dominant voltages from each of CANH and CANL. Using the
past κR measurements, as in line 2, Viden roughly estimates what percentile the
current tracking point, Λ, represents. In Viden, we set R = 10. Then, to correct
and thus move the tracking point Λ to the desired position — where it represents
the P ∗ percentile — an adjustment is made as in line 2, where α is a design
parameter determining the sensitivity to changes. With the adjustment function
proportional to (P ∗ − #(V <Λ)#V )3, the tracking points move faster if they are far
away from their desired positions. As a result, the four tracking points move
if the transmitter’s voltage distribution (i.e., output behavior) shows changes,
thus adapting to any changes on the CAN bus. Instead of tracking, it is also
possible to directly derive the percentiles from the κR values. Viden, however,
does not follow this since it is too sensitive to transient changes, especially when
κR is small, i.e., insufficient samples in deriving the percentiles. Thus, in order
to make Viden work under various circumstances, we track them instead.
3.6 Phase 3: Attacker Identification
A voltage instance (F1–F6) represents the momentary voltage output behavior
of the message transmitter. So, to log its usual behavior, Viden exploits every
newly derived voltage instance to construct/update the voltage profile of the
message transmitter. Although the voltage instances are derived ”per message
ID”, if messages originate from the same transmitter/ECU, their instances are
near-equivalent, thus leading to construction of the same voltage profile. We
will later show through evaluations that there exists only one voltage profile
for a given transmitter/ECU, thus enabling its fingerprinting. By exploiting a
newly derived voltage instance, Viden first updates the cumulative voltage devi-
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ations (CVDs) of features F1–F6. We define a CVD to represent how much the
transmitter’s dominant voltages deviated cumulatively from their ideal values.
Thus, for feature Fx, the CVD at step n, CV Dx[n], is updated as:
CV Dx[n] = CV Dx[n− 1] + ∆[n] (1− νx[n]/ν∗x) , (2)
where ∆[n] is the elapsed time since step n− 1, νx[n] the value of feature Fx at
step n, and ν∗x the desired value of νx. Ideally, the most frequently measured as
well as any percentiles of the CANH and CANL dominant voltages should be
equal to 3.5V and 1.5V, respectively, i.e., no variations in their output voltages.
Therefore, for features {F1, F3, F5}, which represent CANH values, we set
ν∗{1,3,5} = 3.5V and similarly we set ν
∗
{2,4,6} = 1.5V .
Suppressing transient changes. As ECUs have different VCC , ground,
and RDSON values, they output different CANH and CANL dominant voltages.
Their momentary voltage instances would, therefore, be different, and hence the
trends in their CVD changes would also be different from each other. So, for
every obtained CVD of features F1–F6, Viden derives Ψ[n] =
∑6
x=1 CV Dx[n].
The reason for Viden’s summing of all the CVDs is to exploit V3. Recall
from Section 3.3 that V3 gives us transient deviations in CANH and CANL
output voltages are opposite in direction. So, via CVD summation, Viden
suppresses any transient deviations that have occurred (due to changes in driver,
temperature, etc.) when constructing and/or updating the voltage profiles.
Note that since CAN is a differential bus, F2, F4, F6 suppress F1, F3, F5,
respectively.
Voltage profile. Suppression of transient changes yields a value, Ψ, that
(mostly) represents the consistent factors in the voltage instances: VCC , ground
voltages, and the usual voltage drops across the transistors. As stated in V4,
since these values are rather constant, the accumulated sum of Ψ, Ψaccum[n] =∑n
k=1 Ψ[k] becomes linear in time. Moreover, from V1–V2, as Ψ values are
distinct for different ECUs, the trends in how Ψaccum changes also become
different, i.e., the slopes in a Ψaccum–time graph are different. Therefore, Viden
formulates a linear parameter identification problem as Ψaccum[n] = Υ[n]t[n] +
e[n], where at step n, Υ[n] is the regression parameter, t[n] the elapsed time,
and e[n] the identification error. As the regression parameter Υ represents the
slope of the linear model and varies with the transmitter, we define this as
the voltage profile. This way of formulating the problem and constructing the
profiles facilitates Viden’s online update of fingerprints, which is key to Viden’s
adaptability. To determine the voltage profile Υ, i.e., fingerprint ECUs, we use
an adaptive signal processing technique, the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) [30],
which is an online approach in learning the regression parameter. Note, however,
that the choice of algorithm does not affect Viden’s performance. In RLS, we
use kiloseconds (=103 secs) as the unit for t. Due to space limitation, we omit
details of RLS, and refer the readers to [30] for its details. We will later show, via
experimental evaluations, that the thus-derived profile Υ is constant over time
and also distinct for different ECUs, thus allowing Viden to correctly fingerprint
them.
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Identifying the attacker. When an adversary mounts an attack, the
underlying IDS can determine whether the message is malicious or not, so Viden
can filter out the voltage outputs obtained only from the (detected) attack
messages and build a voltage profile from only those. We refer to such a voltage
profile as an intrusion voltage profile. Viden then looks up the voltage profiles
it had built until the detection of the attack and searches for the one that is
similar to the intrusion voltage profile.1 This way, Viden identifies the attacker
ECU.
The performance of Viden will, of course, depend on how well the IDS
detects the intrusion; this dependency needs to be investigated when an IDS
and Viden are integrated as a whole system. Note, however, that the mostly
periodic nature of in-vehicle messages makes correct detection of intrusions not
as difficult as pinpointing the attacker ECU. Researchers and car-makers are
now well aware of how to detect intrusions, but not how to accurately identify
the attacker ECU.
The only case where the identified ECU would have an unknown/unlearned
profile is when it was physically attached to the vehicle by an adversary. How-
ever, since this requires physical access and its identification has been addressed
elsewhere [24, 17], we do not discuss its detection any further in this paper.
3.7 Phase 4: Verification
By the birthday paradox, two different ECUs may naturally have near-equivalent
voltage profiles, i.e., voltage profile collision, thus confusing Viden in identify-
ing the attacker ECU. Note, however, that Viden has at least narrowed its
search scope significantly. An adversary may also attempt to mimic some other
ECU’s voltage output behavior, i.e., targeted impersonation. In such a case
where further verification besides the voltage profiles is required, in Phase 4 of
Viden, machine classifiers are run with the (momentary) voltage instances as
their inputs, i.e., F1–F6 as their features. This way, an analysis of attacks from
a different vantage point — not only its trend (Phase 3) but also its momentary
behavior — is performed, thus resolving ambiguities in attacker identification.
We, however, stress that while the adaptability achieved from Phase 3 is an
essential attribute for an accurate attacker identification, Phase 4 cannot to-
tally replace it, i.e., only complements Phase 3. We will later show through
evaluations that by using voltage instances as machine classifiers’ input, Viden
can resolve issues such as voltage profile collision and an adversary’s targeted
impersonation.
3.8 Voltage Profile Adjustment
For attacker identification, it is important to not only have the correct finger-
print of an ECU but also that fingerprint to be still valid when examining a
voltage measurement obtained during the (detected) attack. If it was updated
1The initial set of “ground truth” voltage profiles can be verified via timing-based finger-
printing schemes [31, 14].
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much earlier than when the attack was detected, any changes occurred between
those two time instants would not be reflected in the latest model, thus leading to
false identifications. We refer to this as a model-exam discrepancy. Since Viden
continuously updates the voltage profiles in real time, such a model-exam dis-
crepancy is minimized/nullified. Since attacker identification is performed upon
detection of an intrusion, as long as Viden keeps the fingerprints up-to-date
until an intrusion is detected (by an IDS), Viden can locate the source of the
attack. Even when there are abrupt changes in the temperature of an ECU,
Viden suppresses those transient changes, and adapts its model accordingly for
an accurate attacker identification.
One corner case in which the performance of Viden might suffer from the
model-exam discrepancy would be when the vehicle has not been turned on
for a long time. During that period, various features (e.g., power supply level,
ambient temperature) which affect the output voltages might have changed. In
such a case, since the old voltage profiles may not correctly reflect the current
status, Viden may have to reconstruct (instead of update) them. In fact, a
timing-voltage-aware adversary may attempt to exploit such a fact and attack
the CAN bus as soon as the vehicle is turned on, making Viden incapable of
handling the attacks. However, even in such a case, as ECUs use the same power
source, i.e., battery, and thus all voltage profiles change in the same direction
and with the same magnitude, Viden re-adjusts and reuses the old ones as
a starting point for voltage profile update rather than reconstructing it from
scratch when the vehicle is turned on. Specifically, Viden first determines how
much of common changes occurred in ECUs’ VCC by deriving the differences
between the previous and current mean values of (F3+F4+F5+F6)/2 — an
estimated value of VCC based on Eq. (1). Viden then adds the thus-derived
differences to ν∗ (in Eq. (2)) based on the fact that if common changes in VCC
incur, CANH and CANL output values increase simultaneously [20, 21]. This
way, Viden correctly adjusts/updates its voltage profile(s) and thus identifies
such a type of timing-voltage-aware adversary; we will later evaluate this via
real vehicle experiments. Note, however, that if voltage-based fingerprinting was
done solely via batch learning (as in [16, 17]), it cannot make such an adjustment,
suffer from high model-exam discrepancy, thus allowing a timing-voltage-aware
adversary to evade it.
3.9 Security of Viden
Once an intrusion is detected, via voltage measurements, Viden can identify the
attacker ECU.
A naive adversary would be capable of controlling the vehicle via continuous
message injections. However, since he has no knowledge of how ECUs might
be fingerprinted, he would inject them imprudently. In such a case, he cannot
evade Viden.
A timing-aware adversary who knows that ECUs can be fingerprinted via
timing analysis, will attempt to exploit this knowledge in not only controlling
the vehicle but also evading the fingerprinting device. For example, the adver-
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sary may know that CIDS [14] can identify the attacker ECU only if the attack
messages were injected periodically. Hence, he may perform an arbitrary imper-
sonation by injecting messages aperiodically, thus fooling CIDS. Note, however,
that CIDS would still detect the presence of the attack. In addition, based
on his knowledge that CIDS’s fingerprints are basically clock skews, he may
attempt to imitate the targeted ECU’s clock behavior, i.e., targeted imperson-
ation. However, with Viden also installed in the vehicle, since it identifies the
attacker ECU via voltage measurements, i.e., irrespective of message timings, a
timing-aware adversary can evade CIDS, but not Viden.
A timing-voltage-aware adversary may also try to evade Viden using his
knowledge of how voltage-based fingerprinting devices run. In order to achieve
this, when or before the adversary injects the attack messages, he may attempt
to change the voltage output levels by changing the supply voltage (e.g., run
processes which drain battery) or by heating up or cooling down the ECUs so
that the transistors’ internal resistance values change. He could even attempt
to start attacking the CAN bus only when the vehicle is turned on after staying
off for a long time as discussed in Section 3.8. However, since Viden performs an
online update of voltage-based fingerprints and also adjusts them if necessary,
thus minimizing/nullifying model-exam discrepancy, it would be difficult for the
timing-voltage-aware adversary to evade Viden. Moreover, since Viden analyzes
voltage outputs from two different perspectives — momentary behavior (Phase
4) and its trend (Phase 3) — a timing-voltage-aware adversary incapable of
precisely controlling the instantaneous voltage outputs cannot evade Viden.
4 Evaluation
We now evaluate the practicability and efficiency of Viden in achieving an effec-
tive and accurate attacker identification on a CAN bus prototype and two real
vehicles. When running Viden for both evaluation settings, in Phase 1, M = 30
dominant voltages were obtained for each message ID for N = 50 rounds. From
Phase 2, voltage instances were outputted whenever κ = 15 non-ACK voltages
from both CANH and CANL were acquired.
4.1 Evaluation Setups
CAN bus prototype. As shown in Fig. 8a, we configured a CAN prototype in
which all four nodes were connected to each other. Each node consists of an Ar-
duino UNO board and a SeeedStudio CAN shield. The CAN bus shield consists
of a Microchip MCP2515 CAN controller and a MCP2551 CAN transceiver to
provide CAN bus communication capabilities. Only two nodes were configured
to have a 120Ω terminal resistor so as to match RL = 60Ω.
The three prototype nodes A, B, and C were programmed to inject messages
0x01, 0x07, and 0x15 at random message intervals within [20ms, 200ms]. The
fourth node V was programmed to run Viden and construct voltage profiles for
messages 0x01, 0x07, and 0x15 (i.e., transmitters A, B, and C), respectively.
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+(a) CAN bus prototype. (b) 2013 Honda Accord.
(c) 2015 Chevrolet Trax. (d) Connection to the vehicle.
Figure 8: Experiments were conducted on a CAN bus prototype and on two
real vehicles.
The reason for injecting the messages aperiodically is to show that even in such
cases, Viden is capable of fingerprinting the transmitters. For node V that runs
Viden, its CANH and CANL lines were not only connected to the bus but also
to the microcontroller’s Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC), which had 10-bit
resolution and was configured to sample voltages at its maximum rate of 50
KSamples/sec. This way, V acquired measurements of dominant voltages on
the bus when nodes A–C were sending their messages. The CAN bus prototype
was set up to operate at 500Kbps, which is typical for in-vehicle high-speed
CAN buses. In such settings, Viden required only 2–3 messages to output a
voltage instance and update the profiles.
Real vehicles. Two cars, 2013 Honda Accord (Fig. 8b) and a 2015 Chevro-
let Trax (Fig. 8c), were also used for our experimental evaluation of Viden.
Through the OBD-II port, the Viden node (V) was connected to the in-vehicle
CAN bus, both running at 500Kbps. From a laptop and through the Viden
node, as shown in Fig. 8d, we were able to read messages from the 2013 Honda
Accord’s and the 2015 Chevrolet Trax’s CAN buses. While Viden was receiving
messages from the two vehicles, it sampled their CANH and CANL voltages
and then derived their ECUs’ voltage instances and profiles.
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Figure 9: Voltage profiles obtained from the CAN bus prototype and the two
real vehicles.
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4.2 Voltage Profiles as Fingerprints
We first evaluate the accuracy and validity of using voltage profiles to fingerprint
the transmitter ECUs.
CAN bus prototype. Fig. 9a shows the voltage profiles of all the three
messages sent on the prototype bus. Although the three CAN prototypes nodes
were built with the same hardware, the corresponding message IDs showed dif-
ferent trends in how their Ψaccum changed over time, since the three ECUs differ
in their supply and transistor characteristics. Based on the RLS implemented in
Viden, we were able to find that nodes A, B, and C had different voltage profiles
(Υ) being equal to 10.1, -154.3, and -4.9, respectively. In other words, voltage
profiles of 0x01, 0x07, and 0x15 were shown to be different from each other as
they were sent by different ECUs, thus verifying the feasibility and accuracy of
Viden.
Real vehicles. In the CAN prototype, we knew which ECU is sending
which message(s), but it is difficult to know this in a real vehicle. In order to
obtain the ground truth on the message source(s), we exploit the schemes in
[31, 14], which analyzed timing patterns in CAN for fingerprinting the ECUs.
Note, however, that these are used only for obtaining the ground truth, since
those cannot identify the attacker ECU if messages are injected at random times.
Through the connected Viden node, we not only logged the CAN traffic
of the 2013 Honda Accord but also measured the dominant voltages from its
CAN bus. The measurements were made on a stationary vehicle, but while
continuously changing their operations (e.g., pressing brake pedal, turning the
steering wheel) to generate some transient changes. In Appendix B, we show
that outputs in Viden is not affected by whether the car is being driven or
stationary. By logging the CAN traffic and exploiting the schemes in [31, 14],
we were able to verify that messages {0x091, 0x1A6} were sent from some
ECU A, {0x309} from B, {0x191, 0x1ED} from C, {0x1EA, 0x1D0} from D,
{0x1AA} from E, and {0x1A4} from F. Fig. 9b shows the messages’ voltage
profiles. The profiles (Υ) derived by Viden are shown to be equivalent only for
those messages sent from the same ECU; ECU A sending {0x091, 0x1A6} had
ΥA = 102.6, B sending {0x309} had ΥB = 85.0, C sending {0x191, 0x1ED} had
ΥC = 137.0, D sending {0x1EA, 0x1D0} had ΥD = −39.2, E sending {0x1AA}
had ΥE = 67.5, while F sending {0x1A4} had ΥF = 120.8. This result again
shows that voltage profiles for different ECUs are different and can thus be used
as their fingerprints.
To further verify that Viden’s capability of fingerprinting is not restricted to
a specific vehicle model, Viden was also run on a 2015 Chevrolet Trax. Again,
by exploiting the schemes in [31, 14], we obtained the ground truths of messages
{0x1FC, 0x362} sent from some ECU A, {0x19D, 0x199} from B, {0x348} from
C, {0x1E9} from D, and {0x2F9} from E. Fig. 9c shows the result of Viden
determining that {0x1FC, 0x362} have a voltage profile of ΥA = −14.7, {0x19D,
0x199} have ΥB = −2.8, {0x348} has ΥC = 5.9, {0x1E9} has ΥD = 1.8, and
{0x2F9} has ΥE = −4.4. Thus, using voltage measurements, Viden correctly
fingerprinted their transmitters. This again confirms the diversity of voltage
22
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
3400
3450
3500
3550
3600
Time [Sec]
F 1
 
−
 
M
os
t f
re
qu
en
t C
AN
H 
[m
V]
 
 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
1300
1350
1400
1450
1500
1550
Time [Sec]
F 2
 
−
 
M
os
t f
re
qu
en
t C
AN
L 
[m
V]
 
 
0x309 by B
0x191 by C
0x1D0 by D
0x309 by B
0x191 by C
0x1D0 by D
(a) 2013 Honda Accord.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
3400
3450
3500
3550
3600
Time [Sec]
F 1
 
−
 
M
os
t f
re
qu
en
t C
AN
H 
[m
V]
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1400
1420
1440
1460
1480
Time [Sec]
F 2
 
−
 
M
os
t f
re
qu
en
t C
AN
L 
[m
V]
 
 
0x1FC by A
0x199 by B
0x1E9 by D
0x1FC by A
0x199 by B
0x1E9 by D
(b) 2015 Chevrolet Trax.
Figure 10: Features F1 and F2 of Viden in the two real vehicles.
profiles (of different ECUs), thus facilitating Viden’s fingerprinting of in-vehicle
ECUs. Moreover, these results show that Viden’s fingerprinting is not limited
to a specific vehicle model, and can thus be applied to other vehicle models.
4.3 Voltage Outputs in Real Vehicles
We provided 4 characteristics, V1–V4, which were imperative for Viden in fin-
gerprinting ECUs. We evaluate whether V1–V3 actually hold in real vehicles.
Note that Fig. 9 verifies V4, corroborating that the voltage profiles of ECUs
were constant over time, i.e., linear.
Different outputs. According to V1–V2, ECUs output different dominant
voltages. Fig. 10a plots features F1–F2 (i.e., the most frequently measured
CANH and CANL values) outputted by Viden for messages 0x309 (sent by B),
0x191 (sent by C), and 0x1D0 (sent by D) in the Honda Accord. Although
the transceivers of all those messages are to output the agreed-on CANH=3.5V
and CANL=1.5V when sending a 0-bit, they outputted values deviating from
them. More importantly, their output levels were clearly discriminable. Even
though ECU B, which sent 0x309, was shown to output similar CANH dominant
voltages to ECU D, it outputted totally different voltages on CANL. Similarly,
Fig. 10b plots F1–F2 values of 0x1FC (sent from A), 0x199 (sent from B), and
0x1E9 (sent from D) outputted by Viden in the 2015 Chevrolet Trax. Again,
we can see that the transmitters of those messages did not output the desired
levels, but outputted discernible levels. These results confirm that V1–V2 hold
even in real vehicles, thus facilitating Viden’s fingerprinting.
Transient changes. V3 states that transient changes in CANH and CANL
voltages are opposite in direction. Fig. 11 shows the 4 tracked percentiles, F3–
F6, of message 0x1D0 in the 2013 Honda Accord. F3–F6 values are shown to
temporarily deviate from and later return to their usual values. Since F3 and F5
are inverses of F4 and F6, respectively, vertically reversed shapes of the former
resemble those of the latter. Thus, summing them suppressed their transient
deviations when deriving the voltage profiles. Note, however, that since the
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Figure 11: Changes of message 0x1D0 in the Honda Accord.
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Figure 12: Viden identifying a timing-aware adversary.
tracked values in Viden depend on the time of sampling and its accuracy, the
summation did not completely remove the deviations, but it sufficed for finger-
printing.
4.4 Against a Timing-Aware Adversary
We evaluated Viden’s performance of attacker identification in the CAN bus
prototype and in a real vehicle against a timing-aware adversary. We did not
evaluate its performance against a naive adversary since the timing-aware ad-
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versary subsumes his capabilities.
CAN bus prototype. In the CAN bus prototype, we further programmed
node C to be the timing-aware adversary who injects not only 0x15 but also
attack messages with ID=0x01 at a random interval of 10–20ms; injecting mes-
sages aperiodically to perform arbitrary impersonation and thus evade timing-
based fingerprinting devices. Note that 0x01 is also being sent from the legiti-
mate node A at a random interval of 20–200ms. Fig. 12a shows the determined
voltage profiles for all three messages during the mounted attack. Even though
the voltage profile for 0x01 now reflects both the voltage outputs from A and C,
since the injection frequency from the attacker C was much higher, the voltage
profile for 0x01 changed to a profile equivalent to the one shown in 0x15 (sent
by C). As a result, Viden determined that the transmitters of 0x01 and 0x15
are the same, thus identifying the source of the attack to be ECU C. Note that
even when the injection frequency is lower, the attacker ECU can be identified
by observing the intrusion voltage profile.
Real vehicle. We also evaluated Viden’s performance against a timing-
aware adversary in a real vehicle setting. We focus on the results obtained
from the 2013 Honda Accord for the purpose of more in-depth discussion. We
consider a scenario in which a timing-aware adversary controlling the Honda
Accord ECU D attacks ECU B and also impersonates ECU A, i.e., targeted
impersonation. Thus, from the vehicle, Viden acquired voltage instances and
profiles of the monitored messages: 0x091 sent from A, 0x309 from B, and
{0x1EA, 0x1D0} from D. To generate the scenario of D impersonating A (while
attacking B), V was further programmed to record only every 4-th message of
0x091 (sent by A every 15ms), and every 3rd message of 0x1D0 (sent by D every
20ms) as its ID to be 0x309. This was to emulate a scenario where the attacker
D injects its attack messages with forged ID=0x309 at a similar frequency to
A, thus attempting to imitate its timing behavior for impersonation.
Fig. 12b plots the voltage profiles of {0x091, 0x1EA, 0x1D0} and the intru-
sion voltage profile of 0x309. Although the adversary attempted to impersonate
ECU A, one can see that since Viden fingerprints the transmitter regardless of
message timings, the intrusion voltage profile of 0x309 matched the profiles of
{0x1EA, 0x1D0}. As a result, Viden concluded the attacker to be D.
4.5 Against a Timing-Voltage-Aware Adversary
Based on his knowledge of voltage-based fingerprinting devices, a timing-voltage-
aware adversary could attempt to evade Viden in two ways. First, the adver-
sary might perform arbitrary impersonation by attacking the vehicle only when
voltage-based fingerprints have not been updated for a long period of time, i.e.,
a high model-exam discrepancy. Next, the adversary might also perform tar-
geted impersonation by changing its voltage output levels so as to imitate some
specific ECUs’ voltage output behavior.
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Figure 13: Adjusting voltage profiles of {0x091, 0x191}.
4.5.1 Arbitrary impersonation
In most cases of a timing-voltage-aware adversary performing arbitrary imper-
sonation, Viden accordingly/adaptively updates the voltage profiles and can
thus correctly identify the attacker. One corner case, however, in detecting the
adversary would be when he performs arbitrary impersonation by attacking the
vehicle only after a long idle period. To verify Viden’s reaction to such an adver-
sary, we evaluated the following scenario. We first obtained the voltage profiles
of 0x091 and 0x191 from the 2013 Honda Accord while driving the vehicle for ap-
proximately 10 mins. After 8 and 10 days had elapsed, we again obtained their
profiles; the average temperatures during the three days were 14.4◦C, 7.7◦C,
and 12.2◦C, respectively. In between the three update dates, the vehicle was
driven 700 miles and 40 miles to generate (on purpose) the considered scenario
where the voltage profiles might be outdated, thus becoming a chance for the
timing-voltage-aware adversary to perform arbitrary impersonation.
Fig. 13a shows the acquired voltage profiles corresponding to messages 0x091
and 0x191 on the three different dates. The initial profiles obtained were found
different from those obtained on the 8-th and 10-th elapsed days, whereas the
latter two were equivalent. One interesting observation, however, was that the
voltage profiles of both message IDs were decreased by the same amount. The
changes we observed were due to a slight shift in all ECUs’ VCC — most probably
due to the change in the battery state after the long 700 miles driving. In such a
case, as we discussed in Section 3.8, Viden adjusts its voltage profiles. Once such
an adjustment was made, we obtained the results shown in Fig. 13b, where all
voltage profiles were properly aligned. This result shows that Viden is capable
of handling cases where a timing-voltage-aware adversary performs arbitrary
impersonation right after a vehicle’s long idle period.
4.5.2 Targeted impersonation
Under scenarios where a timing-aware adversary performs arbitrary/targeted
impersonation or where a timing-voltage-aware adversary performs an arbitrary
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Figure 14: Efficacy of Viden’s Phase 4 execution.
impersonation, Viden can correctly identify him solely based on voltage profiles,
i.e., within Phase 3. It could be much more challenging for Viden (requiring
to run Phase 4) when a timing-voltage-aware adversary performs a targeted im-
personation, i.e., trying to imitate some specific ECU’s voltage outputs. Since
the adversary creates a situation of at least two ECUs having similar voltage
profiles (i.e., not unique), targeted impersonation would be more difficult for
Viden to handle than arbitrary impersonation. We evaluated how Viden per-
forms against such an adversary via (1) vehicle experiments and (2) simulations
based on vehicle data.
Experiment-based evaluation. In the real vehicle setting, to generate a
case which reflects a timing-voltage-aware adversary performing targeted imper-
sonation, we considered the following scenario in the Honda Accord: adversary’s
ECU C, which usually sends 0x191, injects attack messages with ID=0x309, thus
attacking its original sender B and at the same time imitating A’s voltage output
behavior. In generating such a scenario, evaluation settings were similar to the
previous ones, except that Viden recorded every 10n-th message of 0x191 as its
ID to be 0x309. This was to generate the voltage profile of 0x309 to be similar
to A’s as in Fig. 14a; C impersonates A. To introduce ambiguity in the decision,
we do not use the intrusion voltage profile in this evaluation. In such a case,
if only voltage profiles are exploited, Viden might consider ECU A to be the
attacker. However, Viden deals with this in Phase 4 by using voltage instances
as machine classifier’s input. In this evaluation, we used a 200-tree Random
Forest classifier with 50% of the acquired data until detecting the intrusion as
its training set.
Fig. 14b shows the number of misclassified voltage instances by the Random
Forest classifier. It shows that Viden misclassified a large number of 0x309’s
voltage instances as those of 0x191. That is, even when the voltage profiles
of 0x091 and 0x309 were similar, since Viden observed the measurements in
a momentary manner and the adversary was incapable of precisely matching
them, the attack source was correctly identified as C, i.e., transmitter of 0x191,
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A B C D E F
A 100 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 99.3 0 0 0.7 0
C 0 0 100 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 100 0 0
E 0 0 0 0 100 0
F 0 0 0 0 0 100
(a) ”Honda Accord” attack dataset.
A B C D E F G H I J K
A 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 1.5 98.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
F 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
G 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0
J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.2 0 96.8
(b) ”Honda Accord + Chevrolet Trax” attack dataset.
Table 1: Confusion matrix of Viden [Unit: %].
not A. This validates that by using voltage instances as machine classifiers’
inputs, Viden can prevent targeted impersonation by a timing-voltage-aware
adversary.
By the Birthday paradox, at least two ECUs may naturally have similar
voltage profiles. However, since Viden was feasible to distinguish them via
machine classifiers, profile collision can be mitigated.
Simulation-based evaluation. In addition to the scenario shown in Fig. 14a,
which we evaluated via real vehicle experiments, there could be different ways
in which a timing-voltage-aware adversary might perform targeted imperson-
ation. For example, the adversary might heat up or cool down his ECU to
match some other ECUs’ voltage profiles, even before he starts injecting attack
messages. Thus, we conducted a more in-depth evaluation as follows. Based
on the 35-min data of voltage instances output by the Honda Accord’s 6 ECUs
and those output by the Chevrolet Trax’s 5 ECUs, two attack datasets were
constructed to each contain 1000 different “targeted impersonation” attempts
by a timing-voltage-aware adversary. We refer to Honda Accord’s ECUs as A–F
and Chevrolet Trax’s ECUs as G–K. The first dataset was based on only volt-
age instances of A–F whereas the second was based on data from both vehicles,
assuming that A–K lie in the same vehicle. Such an assumption was made to
evaluate how Viden performs when the number of ECUs increases. Each im-
personation attempt was constructed by (1) randomly choosing one ECU to be
the adversary and another to be the victim, then (2) randomly choosing the
times when the adversary starts to change his voltage outputs and (later) when
to start attacking the victim, and finally (3) steadily shifting the adversary’s
voltage instance values (when it starts impersonation) so that his voltage pro-
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file matches the victim’s, i.e., profile collision, before mounting an attack. Note,
however, that such a shift does not make their instantaneous instances to be
equivalent. As we discussed in Section 3.1, although an adversary may match
the target’s profile, it would be very difficult for him to precisely follow the
target’s instantaneous behaviors (e.g., transient changes due to temperature).
This way, we were able to emulate a scenario where the adversary first imitates
some specific ECU’s voltage output behavior and then injects attack messages.
Table 1a shows the confusion matrix of Viden when identifying the attacker
of the 1000 targeted impersonation attempts in the first attack dataset. For
identification, Viden not only used voltage profiles but also a 200-tree Random
Forest with voltage instances as its input. Again, half of the data until an
attack was detected was used as the training set. Thanks to Viden’s analysis of
the adversary’s impersonation attempts from two different viewpoints — ECU’s
usual voltage output behavior via voltage profiles and its momentary behavior
via voltage instances — Viden was able to identify the attacker with only a
0.2% false identification rate. Even when Viden was evaluated based on our
second attack dataset, which had 11 ECUs, Viden identified the attacker with a
0.3% false identification rate where the confusion matrix is shown in Table 1b.
Albeit the increased number of ECUs, Viden’s false identification rate increased
only by 0.1%, thus corroborating its effectiveness. Note that such false rates
reflect Viden’s capability and robustness against the most skillful adversary who
is aware of timing and voltage, i.e., the timing-voltage-aware adversary. Thus,
Viden’s false rate against all types of the considered adversaries — including
the naive and timing-aware adversaries — would be much lower.
One can also interpret such good performance of Viden equivalent to its
effectiveness in mitigating (naturally occurred) profile collision.
5 Discussion
Number of ECUs on CAN. As of 2017, the average vehicle is reported to
have approximately 25 ECUs, while luxury cars have approximately 50 [32],
but not all of them on CAN; some are installed on LIN, MOST, etc. Moreover,
to accommodate a large (increasing) number of ECUs on bandwidth-limited
CAN, each vehicle is equipped with multiple CAN buses [33]. Accordingly,
network architectures of various modern vehicles (Audi A8, Honda Accord, Jeep
Cherokee, Infiniti Q50, etc.) are shown to have 3∼20 ECUs per CAN bus [34];
a similar figure to which we considered in our evaluations. Hence, if Viden was
installed on each CAN bus in a vehicle, profile collision within that bus is much
less likely to occur than the case when all ECUs are (considered to be) installed
on one single CAN bus. Even in such a case with profile collisions, Viden can
still handle it via the execution of its Phase 4.
Multiple ECUs per ID. Viden may underperform when multiple ECUs
are assigned to send messages with the same ID, albeit unusual/rare. For ex-
ample, although message ID=0x040 is scheduled to be sent, in turn, by ECUs
A–D, Viden would construct only one voltage profile for 0x040. However, if
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such scheduling information is known in advance (e.g., every 4n-th message of
0x040 is sent by D), which is in fact defined by the car-makers, then Viden could
construct voltage profiles accordingly, thus solving the problem.
Intrusion Detection. Timing-based IDSs exploit the periodic nature of
CAN messages and thus suffice to detect attacks on periodic messages, but fail
to detect attacks on aperiodic ones. Since Viden determines the transmitter
ECU based on voltages, similarly to [16, 17], it can complement those IDSs in
detecting intrusions. However, since most in-vehicle messages are periodic [14]
and thus most intrusions are detectable, Viden’s potential is maximized when
it is used for attacker identification.
Attacker from Another In-vehicle Network. If the attack originates
from a different in-vehicle network (e.g., FlexRay, MOST, LIN) inside the vehicle
other than CAN, the corresponding gateway ECU will be the one that injects
attack messages into CAN. Viden will, therefore, identify that gateway ECU
as the attacker, since Viden is designed just for CAN. In such a case, the best
both Viden and the gateway ECU can do is to look up the message routing
table (describing which messages/signals to forward to/from), and identify the
“compromised network”. Handling such a scenario is important in integrating
Viden in real vehicles.
Limitations. For Viden to identify the attacker ECU, it requires at least
one voltage profile to use. For the example shown in Fig. 12b, Viden referred to
the voltage profiles of {0x1EA, 0x1D0} to determine that the attacker ECU was
D. Since most ECUs are designated to transmit at least one message ID, one
can identify the attacker ECU with Viden. However, if the compromised ECU
does not send any messages, Viden’s attacker identification can be inaccurate.
In such a case, the best Viden can do would be obtaining the voltage profile
of those ECUs during the manufacturing stage and updating them via voltage
profile adjustments.
6 Conclusion
State-of-the-art vehicle security solutions lack a key feature of identifying the
attacker ECU on the in-vehicle network, which is essential for efficient forensic,
isolation, security patching, etc. To meet this need, we have proposed Viden,
which fingerprints ECUs based on voltage measurements. Via the ACK learning
phase, Viden obtained correct measurements of voltages only from the message
transmitters, and exploited them for constructing and updating correct voltage
profiles/fingerprints. Using these profiles, we showed via evaluations on a CAN
bus prototype and two real vehicles that Viden can identify the attacker ECU
with a low false identification rate of 0.2%. Considering the fact that vehicles
are safety-critical, Viden is an important first step toward securing the vehicles
and protecting drivers and passengers.
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Appendices
A ACK threshold learning in a real vehicle
Viden first learns the thresholds which determine whether the measured voltages
are from the ACK slot or not, before outputting voltage instances and profiles.
This was achieved by determining most frequent and maximum/minimum sets,
and exploiting the side lobe which only exists in the latter. In other words,
the existence of such a side lobe (as shown in Fig. 7 in a CAN prototype),
which represents the distribution of ACK voltages, is critical in learning the
ACK threshold. Thus, to show that the proposed ACK learning is feasible
even in real vehicles, through Viden, we obtained both most frequent and maxi-
mum/minimum sets for message ID=0x091, which was sent every 10ms by some
ECU in the 2013 Honda Accord.
Fig. 15 (upper) shows the kernel density plots of the most frequent and
maximum sets of the CANH dominant voltages while receiving ID=0x091, and
Fig. 15 (lower) the kernel density of those obtained from the CANL line. One
can see that as in the CAN prototype result (Fig. 7), side lobes exist in both the
CANH and CANL lines. Thus, the proposed ACK learning mechanism in Viden
derived the refined maximum and minimum sets, S′max and S
′
min, correctly and
thus derived the ACK thresholds of message 0x091 to be 3.844V for CANH
outputs and 1.114V for CANL outputs.
One interesting observation is how high and low CANH and CANL ACK
voltage levels are. In our evaluation of Viden on the CAN prototype, since we
had only 3 nodes acknowledging to the message, the median of the CANH ACK
voltages was 3.514V as shown in Fig. 7. On the other hand, in our experiment
on the 2013 Honda Accord, the median of the CANH ACK voltage showed a
high voltage level, 4.049V — much higher than the one obtained from the CAN
prototype. For the CANL ACK voltage, the median was 0.953V. Such a result
is due to the fact that there were much more ECUs (compared to 3 in the
prototype) inside the vehicle which ACKed message 0x091.
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Figure 15: Deriving the ACK thresholds for message 0x091 in the 2013 Honda
Accord.
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Figure 16: Voltage profiles of message 0x191 when the vehicle was stationary
and driven.
B Voltage profiles while driving
We further validate that Viden’s derived voltage profiles do not depend on
whether and how the vehicle is driven. We first obtained the voltage instances
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of 0x191 from the 2013 Honda Accord’s CAN bus. At this time of measurement,
the vehicle was stationary. Later on that day, instances of 0x191 was once again
obtained, but this time while driving the vehicle for approximately 10 mins; the
same data which we used in Section 4.5.1.
Fig. 16 shows the voltage profiles of 0x191 obtained while the vehicle was
stationary and driven. One can see that the two voltage profiles are equivalent,
even though they were measured under a different condition. These are due to
the fact that the voltage outputs are much more dependent on hardware com-
ponents’ characteristics than their momentary conditions. Moreover, transient
deviations incurred from changes in momentary conditions would have been
suppressed thanks to how Viden derives its voltage profiles; summing CVDs of
CANH and CANL.
35
